

## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <a href="http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content">http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content</a>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

EMINENT DOMAIN—RAILROAD PROPERTY NOT TO BE CONDEMNED FOR STREET.—The city sought in the State court to condemn certain portions of railroad property adjoining three streets, unconnected and remote from each other, the purpose being to secure control of the railroad property. The property sought to be condemned was not in actual use, but was necessary for the railroad's use in the future. The railroad property was in the hands of a receiver appointed by a federal court. The city based its claim mainly upon the fact that the railroad had ceased to operate and had forfeited its franchise under the terms thereof. Held, the railroad property cannot be condemned by the city. In re 221st. Street in City of New York, 190 N. Y. S. 234 (1921).

While the State legislature may constitutionally authorize the taking of property devoted to a public use for a different public use, it is the settle rule that a general delegation of the power of eminent domain to a municipal corporation does not authorize the taking of property already devoted to a public use, unless it can be shown clearly that the legislature intended such a taking. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 148 Fed. 442 (1906); Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Inhabitants of City of Plainfield, 83 N. J. Law 332, 85 Atl. 321 (1912); In re Sarataga Ave. In City of New York, 226 N. Y. 128, 123 N. E. 197 (1919).

The use of property by a railroad is a use for a public purpose, and it is not essential that the property shall be actually in use if it will be needed for its purposes within a reasonable time in the future. In re Application of Staten Island, etc., R. Co., 103 N. Y. 251, 8 N. E. 548 (1886); In re East 161st. Street In City of New York, 52 Misc. Rep. 596, 102 N. Y. S. 500 (1907); In re Seneca Ave. In City of New York, 98 Misc. Rep. 712, 163 N. Y. S. 503 (1917).

Intoxicating Liquors—Property in Intoxicating Liquors—One Who Enters Building with Intent to Take Intoxicating Liquor Cannot Be Convicted of Burglary.—Certain liquor containing alcohol in excess of the quantity permitted by law was manufactured for beverage purposes subsequently to the passage of the National Prohibition Act. The defendant, with the intent to steal the liquor, entered an outhouse, wherein it was stored. To an information charging the crime of burglary with intent to steal intoxicating liquor, the defendant demurred on the ground that such liquor cannot in legal contemplation be property, inasmuch as there cannot be ownership thereof, in view of the National Prohibition Act. Held, demurrer sustained. People v. Spencer (Cal.), 201 Pac. 130 (1921).

As authority for the instant holding the case of *People v. Caridis*, 29 Cal. App. 166, 154 Pac. 1061 (1915) was cited. But it is to be noted that in that case, although a demurrer to the information charging the crime of grand larceny for the theft of a lottery ticket was sustained, the court states that had the charge been petit larceny in keeping with the intrinsic worth of the ticket the demurrer would not have been allowed. As further authority it is contended that a defendant who broke and entered a stable with intent to steal a dog, could not be indicted for